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This paper adds to the literature by utilizing improved data on tax revenue decentralization to 
re-examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of government. An 
econometric analysis using panel data from 18 OECD countries shows that fiscal 
decentralization matters for both the size and composition of government spending. Tax 
revenue decentralization is associated with a smaller public sector, while expenditure 
decentralization is associated with a larger public sector. The former effect seems to be driven 
by a reduction in social security transfers, while the latter effect seems to be driven by 
increased government consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Early contributions to the theory of fiscal competition emphasized the possibility that 
interjurisdictional competition within a country leads to inefficiently low levels of taxes and 
expenditures (as formalized by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)). Based 
on similar reasoning, there is a large literature going back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave 
(1959) which has warned against the consequences of decentralized responsibility for 
redistribution. Another strand of literature have emphasized that governments do not always 
act in the best interest of the citizens, and that fiscal competition may help to constrain a 
public sector that would otherwise have been inefficiently large (the argument of Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980)). With higher mobility at the sub-central than at the central level 
government level, both strands of literature come to the conclusion that the size of the public 
sector is expected to vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization.  
 
Leaving aside the welfare consequences, there has been a large empirical literature initiated 
by Oates (1985), that has looked for downward pressure on taxes and spending from 
decentralization of fiscal powers. Although a myriad of studies have emerged since Oates 
(1985) seminal contribution, an empirical consensus have not been reached. The econometric 
analyses can be divided into two groups, those that have focused on variation in 
decentralization across sub-central units within countries and those that have focused on 
variation across countries.
1 A major problem with almost all of the latter is that they rely on a 
problematic measure of fiscal decentralization. The standard approach ‘searching for 
Leviathan’ in the cross country setting is to rely on the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which provides data on revenue or expenditure 
shares for sub-central relative to general government. Although GFS provides consistent 
definitions across countries and over time, the data set fails to address properly the 
intergovernmental fiscal structure of countries, and in particular ignores the degree of central 
government control over local tax rates and tax bases. Whether sub-central governments’ 
expenditure is funded by intergovernmental grants, some revenue sharing program or own-
source revenue through independent taxes and user charges clearly makes a difference. Strict 
use of account data may consequently give rise to confounded results because correspondence 
between budgetary items and actual decision making might be imperfect. Although this is 
                                                 
1 Feld et al. (2003) present an extensive literature review.   3
widely accepted, almost all cross country analyses have relied purely on GFS data to study the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of the public sector, including 
Anderson and van den Berg (1998), Ehdaie (1994), Jin and Zou (2002) and Oates (1985).
2  
 
The current analysis is distinctive in particular in two ways. First, improved data on fiscal 
decentralization is introduced and the standard regression evaluating the relationship between 
government size and decentralization is re-examined. Contrary to previous studies the new 
data set, based on Stegarescu (2005), differentiates between revenue of sub-central 
government levels according to their ability to determine revenue sources autonomously. Due 
to the improved quality of the tax revenue indicator it is possible to undertake a panel data 
analysis that includes both tax revenue and expenditure decentralization in the same 
regression. Second, I put the attention to how decentralization affects different parts of the 
public sector, in particular how it affects spending on social security transfers and government 
consumption. The former can be argued to be more redistributive in nature and might 
consequently be differently affected by fiscal decentralization than the latter. The reason is 
that with mobile households, countries with decentralized responsibility for redistribution find 
it harder to redistribute between income groups because generous redistributive programs will 
serve to attract low-income households and chase away those with higher incomes whose 
taxes must finance the transfers. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on panel data from 18 OECD countries
3 over the period 1970 
to 2000, where period averages is utilized to avoid that business cycle fluctuations create a 
spurious relationship between decentralization and government spending. Consistent with 
some more recent studies that have taken the distinction between different types of 
decentralization seriously, notably Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden (2003) and Stein (1999), I find 
an asymmetric impact of tax revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization on 
                                                 
2 A notable exception is Rodden (2003). The measurement problems connected to the IMF 
data is further discussed by Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), Rodden (2003, 2004) and Stegarescu 
(2005) and also identified by Oates (1989) as an important challenge for future research: “in 
view of the forementioned reservations concerning the IMF data, I would have much more 
confidence in my finding of an absence of any relationship between fiscal centralization and 
public sector size at the national level were it confirmed by another study using a new data 
set” (1989: 582).  
3 The 18 countries included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.    4
government spending. Oates’ (1985:754) conclusion that it “makes little difference whether 
we use a revenue or expenditure measure of the extent of fiscal centralization” does not hold 
for the improved indicator for revenue decentralization. The econometric analysis suggests 
that tax revenue decentralization seems to depress the total size of government (as suggested 
by fiscal competition theory), while expenditure decentralization is associated with a larger 
public sector. This is interpreted to be a result of vertical fiscal imbalance which attenuates 
the link between financing of the public sector and its performance. Such vertical fiscal 
imbalance create a common pool problem while simultaneously allowing public officials to 
ignore the financial consequences of competition for mobile tax bases and poor provision of 
public services.  
 
Evaluating the two main parts of overall government expenditures, transfers and government 
consumption, I find that the asymmetric impact on tax revenue and expenditure 
decentralization seems to be driven by two different parts of government expenditures. Social 
security transfers decreases with tax revenue decentralization, but are independent of 
expenditure decentralization. Government consumption is independent of tax revenue 
decentralization, but increases in expenditure decentralization.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and 
the main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data on fiscal decentralization, while section 4 
introduces data on government spending and presents the econometric design. In section 5 the 
results are presented. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
Two different approaches, rooted in two contrasting visions of public sector decision making  
have typically been applied to analyze the effect of fiscal competition between horizontally 
related governments. One strand of literature have emphasized that, assuming benevolent 
policymakers who seek to maximize the ‘well-being of society’, fiscal competition can create 
a welfare reducing ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in public good provision. Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) challenges the notion that tax competition is welfare reducing. Starting with the 
assumption that governments are revenue-maximizing Leviathans’, they argue that emigration 
imposes a serious restriction on the ability of government to exploit taxes. It follows that 
decentralization of the public sector (with higher mobility at the sub-central versus the central   5
government level) introduces elements of competition which will contribute to contain agency 
problems. This is the argument underpinning the famous Leviathan hypothesis: “total 
government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980:185).  
 
Brennan and Buchanan emphasized that the Leviathan hypothesis should be evaluated for 
given extent of ‘collusion’ among governmental units. One obvious form of collusion would 
be agreements between sub-central and central government about revenue sharing programs, 
where the sub-central government cede taxing powers to the central government and receive 
grants in return (Grossman, 1989, Ehdaie 1994). Brennan and Buchanan concluded that such 
arrangements are undesirable “because it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, which is 
to create competition between jurisdictions” (1980:183). Clearly, decentralization of expenditures 
without accompanying decentralization of revenues is unlikely to generate any beneficial 
competition to restrain the Leviathan. The broader problem with such vertical fiscal imbalance is 
the attenuated link between financing of the public sector and its performance. It also introduces 
the possibility for sub-central governments to impose their costs on residents outside their 
jurisdiction. Thus based on the Leviathan hypothesis it is reasonable to expect expenditure 
decentralization to be positively and revenue decentralization negatively associated with the size 
of government.  
 
Note that other links between decentralization and government size may also exist: (i) because 
decentralization provides a better match between the population’s preferences and the public 
services (as captured in Oates (1972) decentralization theorem) or (ii) because political agents 
at the sub-central level are better able to tailor public goods to their constituency’s needs 
(Oates, 1972), or (iii) because decentralization increases the accountability and visibility of 
public officials which may give more competent and less corrupt government.
4 On theoretical 
ground it is not clear how these three mechanisms will affect the size of the public sector. 
Less waste in the public sector is not necessarily associated with a smaller public sector. A 
more efficient public sector implies lower marginal costs of public services which leads 
residents to increase their demand for these expenditures. As a result, the total size of 
government may increase. 
 
                                                 
4 Utilizing cross country data, Fisman and Gatti (2002) found that decentralization is 
associated with lower levels of corruption.    6
An important issue in evaluating the effect of fiscal decentralization on the size of 
government which seems to have been neglected in the previous literature is that 
decentralization may have different impact on different parts of the public sector. Keen and 
Marchand (1996) show that fiscal competition may not only lead to inefficient levels of 
aggregate public expenditures, but also to systematic inefficiencies in the composition of 
public expenditures. They present a theoretical framework with a benevolent planner and 
focus on two parts of public spending: the first being a local public good, such as 
consumption of social services or redistributive payments from altruistic rich to poor 
households. The second is a local public input in the economy’s production function and 
corresponds to for example infrastructure spending. Assuming immobile workers and mobile 
firms, Keen and Marchand show that holding the size of the public sector constant, welfare 
could be increased by a rebalancing of expenditures from publicly provided inputs towards 
provision of local public goods which benefit immobile residents: “the picture that emerges is 
thus one in which fiscal competition leads to too many business centers and airports but not 
enough parks or libraries” (Keen and Marchand 1996: 35). 
 
As emphasized above, fiscal decentralization introduces several mechanisms that might affect 
government spending and this may explain why different analyses have come to different 
conclusions. To try to shed some light on which mechanisms that might be important, the 
current analysis looks at two different kinds of government expenditures, transfers and 
government consumption, and evaluate whether the effects of decentralization differ. 
Assuming immobile households, Keen and Marchand provides one rationale why fiscal 
competition may put a downward pressure on welfare spending. In addition there is a large 
literature in public finance going back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave (1959) that has warned 
against the consequences of decentralized responsibility for redistribution exactly because 
households are mobile. The idea is that policies that are redistributive in nature give rise to a 
phenomenon that resembles adverse selection: net beneficiaries of redistributive policies are 
attracted to generous jurisdictions, while net contributors are repelled (Wildasin, 1991). This 
kind of reasoning led Stigler (1957) to the conclusion that “redistribution is intrinsically a 
national policy” (p. 217). The key point is that decentralized responsibility for redistribution 
without any corrections induces each jurisdiction to choose its policy in isolation, ignoring the 
positive external benefits it creates for other jurisdictions. Fiscal decentralization is thus 
expected to be negatively associated with welfare spending (measured as transfers). 
   7
3. Measuring fiscal decentralization – new data on decentralization of tax revenue 
 
Fiscal decentralization reflects how responsibilities for tax revenues and public expenditures 
are distributed among different tiers of government. The complexity of vertical government 
structures make this notion challenging to quantify. A reliable measure of fiscal 
decentralization needs to effectively quantify the activities of sub-central governments arising 
from their autonomous decisions. The standard approach in cross country analyses is to make 
use of accounting measures of revenue and expenditure shares for sub-central relative to 
general government as a proxy for fiscal decentralization. Until recently the data from the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government Finance Statistics (GFS) was the only 
available cross-national time-series data to generate these measures. Although these measures 
have the advantage of being operational they can give rise to seriously biased results (Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2003).  
 
The problem with the GFS is that it does not separate between locally determined taxes, taxes 
regulated by the central government, taxes levied as surcharges on national taxes and shared 
taxes. Whether sub-central governments’ expenditure is funded by intergovernmental grants, 
some revenue sharing program or own-source revenue through independent taxes and user 
charges clearly makes a difference. OECD (1999) tries to overcome this problem and present 
cross country data which explicitly focused on the role of taxation in determining the fiscal 
autonomy of sub-central governments. The study aimed to classify taxes in terms of the kind 
of autonomy they provided to state and local governments, hence focusing on ‘revenue 
decentralization’. Stegarescu (2005) draws on the analytical framework provided by OECD 
(1999) and expands their dataset to cover 23 OECD countries from 1965 to 2001.
5 
Stegarescu’s data distinguishes between different kinds of sub-central government revenue 
according to the degree of discretion sub-central governments have on determining them 
autonomously. In this respect the data represent a major improvement compared to existing 
measures of fiscal decentralization.  
 
In the empirical analysis presented below I focus on the two main components of fiscal 
decentralization: the assignment of revenue and expenditure responsibilities among different 
tiers of government. The key explanatory variable in the empirical analysis conducted below 
                                                 
5 Contrary to the OECD study, Stegarescu (2005) does not only consider sub-central 
governments’ autonomy of taxes, but also their size relative to general government.   8
is TaxRevDec. TaxRevDec measure the revenue share of sub-central government relative to 
general government, but contrary to what is common in the literature, this variable only 
includes revenues where the sub-central government has discretion over tax rate, tax base or 
both.
6 Because vertical fiscal imbalance may be important I also include ExpDec, measured as 
the share of sub-central to general government expenditure, as a second key variable. This 
variable is based on the Government Finance Statistics (GFS). According to this measure, 
local expenditures that are mandated by the central government or are spent on behalf of the 
central government appear as sub-central expenditures. Consequently this measure may 
overstate the true nature of sub-central expenditure autonomy, but it is nonetheless the best 
measure available. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for TaxRevDec and ExpDec. 
Countries are on average more decentralized in the expenditure, than in the revenue 
dimension (34% vs. 21%). The correlation between the two variables is 0.7.   
 
Focusing on the most reliable measure of fiscal decentralization, TaxRevDec, the 18 countries 
can be divided into three groups with respect to decentralization trends in the period under 
study (1970-2000).
7 A clear trend towards an increasing role for sub-central governments can 
be observed in particular for Belgium, France and Spain, but also for Denmark, Japan, 
Portugal and Sweden.
8 While three countries, Ireland, Norway and the UK, have moved in the 
opposite direction of less sub-central tax autonomy. The remaining 8 countries, including the 
traditional federal countries, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US, 
have had a fairly stable degree of tax revenue decentralization from 1970 to 2000. The trends 
seem to reflect very well with the institutional changes that have taken place in these countries 
(Stegarescu, 2005:323). Separating the traditional federal countries from the remaining 
countries, figures 1 and 2 show the trends in the tax revenue decentralization indicator based 
on 5-year averages. Figure 2 shows that the traditional federal countries underwent no 
                                                 
6 The variable is denoted ’TD1’ in Stegarescu (2005). Stegarescu finds that using the 
conventional measure of revenue decentralization typically overestimates the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. This is particularly the case for Austria, Belgium, Germany and Portugal. 
7 5 countries are excluded from Dan Stegarescu’s data set because of size (Luxembourg and 
Iceland) and uncertainty with respect to data availability (Greece and Italy) and missing data 
on the dependent variables (New Zealand). 
8 Note that considerable differences in trends between the two measures of fiscal 
decentralization are observed. Belgium and France for example have increased their sub-
central share of tax revenue considerably in the period under study (from 7% to 24% and 2% 
to 20%, respectively) while expenditure decentralization remains basically unaltered.   9
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for fiscal decentralization for each country (based on 
period averages) 
Tax revenue decentralization  Expenditure decentralization 
Country 
Mean St.  dev. 
Coefficient
of variation




AUSTRALIA  20.35  1.69 0.08 18.84  23.09  41.23 0.99 0.02 40.11  42.63 
AUSTRIA  3.44  0.12 0.04  3.20 3.54  30.85 0.70 0.02 29.88  31.80 
BELGIUM  12.68  8.18 0.64  5.94 24.24  11.90 1.15 0.10 10.97  13.65 
CANADA  51.73  1.97 0.04 48.21  54.22  57.58 0.95 0.02 56.34  58.82 
DENMARK  29.46  1.64 0.06 27.44  31.80  45.42 1.74 0.04 43.56  48.00 
FINLAND  26.25  1.57 0.06 24.71  29.15  37.95 2.07 0.05 35.11  40.11 
FRANCE  12.30  7.59 0.62  1.72 19.17  18.07 2.36 0.13 16.47  22.81 
GERMANY  7.46  0.35 0.05  6.81 7.77  42.02 2.22 0.05 39.26  45.65 
IRELAND  4.50  3.16 0.70  2.34 10.39  25.21 1.90 0.08 23.32  28.28 
JAPAN  33.05  2.21 0.07 29.71  36.48  43.46 0.00 0.00 43.46  43.46 
NETHERLANDS  3.76  1.03 0.27  2.13 5.12  25.09 1.43 0.06 23.34  26.96 
NEW ZEALAND  6.28  0.71  0.11  5.46  7.04 11.45 1.62  0.14 9.50  13.19 
NORWAY  27.02  3.08 0.11 23.14  31.05  34.66 2.81 0.08 31.81  38.90 
PORTUGAL
a  1.55  1.32 0.85  0.28 3.10  8.74  3.95 0.45  3.46 12.41 
SPAIN
a  12.01  6.17 0.51  7.17 22.40  23.02 9.02 0.39 10.14  31.69 
SWEDEN  41.33  3.90 0.09 35.91  46.39  37.83 4.17 0.11 33.25  44.07 
SWITZERLAND 56.84  1.82  0.03 53.88  59.06  51.77 3.76 0.07 47.30  56.86 
UNITED  KINGDOM  10.34  4.20 0.41  4.83 13.50  25.52 3.25 0.13 21.90  31.03 
UNITED  STATES  37.24  1.04 0.03 35.99  38.81  44.90 2.29 0.05 41.44  47.91 
Note: Tax revenue decentralization based on Stegarescu (2005), Expenditure decentralization based on GFS 
data, period averages. 
aData before 1977 is not included for Portugal and Spain. There are additionally 8 missing 
variables on ExpDec (5 periods for Japan, and 1 period for Belgium, Portugal and Switzerland). 
 
significant changes during the last 30 years. In the empirical analysis, estimation both with 
and without these countries are reported. 
 
4. Econometric specification 
 
The best empirical strategy to study the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector 
spending would be to have some sort of ‘natural experiment’ in which some countries have 
radically altered their vertical government structure and evaluate in particular how these 
reforms have changed government expenditures. During the time period that I study there 
have been implemented some such reforms in some of the countries. To identify the effects of   10






























Note: 5-year averages, 1970-2000. First period: 1970-1976. 
 
these reforms I rely on the tax revenue indicator, TaxRevDec, introduced in section 3, to work 
as a proxy. This indicator changed considerably as a consequence of the reforms taking place 
in for example Belgium in 1989, France in 1980, Portugal in 1989 and in Spain in 1997, 
indicating that this variable captures these reforms well.  
 
Utilizing panel data, inference can be based on variation across countries and/or variation 
within countries. There are two arguments for relying primarily on the latter: First, because 
inherent features of different countries that affect government spending, which are not 
captured in any of the included regressors yields biased cross country estimations. Inference 
based on within country variation is less likely to be subject to omitted variable bias. Second, 
because fiscal decentralization probably is measured more consistent over time than across 
countries. The problem with the within country approach is that vertical government structure 
varies considerably more across countries than within countries (as illustrated in figures 1 and 
2). Thus basing inference purely on within country variation removes a lot of variation in the   11

























Note: 5-year averages, 1970-2000. First period: 1970-1976. 
 
data. In the empirical analysis presented in section 5, I present estimations based on both cross 
country and within country variation. 
 
The standard approach ‘searching for Leviathan’ in the spirit of Oates (1985) is to regress 
some measure of government size on expenditure or revenue decentralization and a set of 
control variables. I re-examine the relationship between government size and fiscal 
decentralization utilizing new data on sub-central fiscal autonomy. Due to the improved 
quality of the tax revenue indicator I can, contrary to previous studies, run regressions where 
both measures of fiscal decentralization is included simultaneously. The econometric 
specification is given by: 
 
  it it it it it GovernmentSize TaxRevDec ExpDec u α βδ γ =+ + + + controls , (i) 
 
where GovernmentSizeit is government expenditures as a share of GDP in country i at time t.  
β  and δ  measures the effect of fiscal decentralization on public sector size and are the   12
coefficients of interest.  it u  is an iid error term. Since ExpDec may overestimate the true extent 
of expenditure decentralization for some countries I report results both with and without this 
variable. To take into account all other potentially important determinants of government 
expenditures that might be correlated with fiscal decentralization, a matrix of controls is 
included. These are elaborated below. Descriptive statistics are included in appendix table A.1 
and A.2.  
 
An important issue in evaluating the effect of fiscal decentralization on the size of 
government which seems to have been neglected in the previous literature is that 
decentralization may have different impact on different parts of the public sector. According 
to Keen and Marchand (1996), the effects of fiscal competition will differ according to the 
extent that the public spending enters as an input into the production function. It may also be 
reasonable to expect the effects to differ according to the redistributive impact of different 
kinds of government spending. Hence, separating public spending according to the United 
Nations’ Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) could be useful. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable longer time series available in the cross country setting for 
this classification. Thus, as a first investigation the current analysis focuses on the two main 
parts of government expenditures, social security transfers (transfers) and government 
consumption (government consumption). As the general measure of the size of government, 
these variables are also based on OECD data. Transfers are defined as “benefits for sickness, 
old-age, family allowances, etc., social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by general 
government” and is commonly used in the welfare state literature (see for example Garrett 
and Mitchell (2001), Huber and Stephens (2001), Rodrik (1997, 1998) and Swank (2002)).  
 
Comparing the period 1970-1976 to the period 1996-2000 most countries have expanded their 
spending on consumption, transfers and overall spending as a share of gdp. The data reveals 
large cross country differences, but also considerable within-country differences. The average 
spending on transfers out of GDP increased from 10.7% in 1970-1976 to 14.5% in 1996-2000, 
peaking in the mid 1990s.
9 This measure is not a perfect measure of welfare spending, but I 
believe it is reasonable to argue that it captures important aspects of the welfare state, in 
                                                 
9 Overall government spending and government consumption exhibit similar trends as transfer 
spending.   13
particular the effort to carry out redistribution.
10 To identify the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on transfers and government consumption, I estimate the following two 
specifications: 
 
  it it it it it Transfers TaxRevDec ExpDec α βδ γ ε =+ + + + controls , (ii) 
 
it it it it it GovernmentConsumption TaxRevDec ExpDec α βδ γ η =+ + + + controls , (iii) 
 
where  it ε  and  it η  are iid error terms. For simplicity the same Greek letters are used to denote 
parameters to be estimated as in (i). Pooling all the data and running an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression on (i), (ii) and (iii) provide consistent and unbiased results only if the error 
terms can be considered to be random across countries and over time. This is a strong 
assumption to make. A potential remedy is to estimate a restricted version of (i), (ii) and (iii) 
which includes a full battery of time and country fixed effects. As discussed above, such 
Fixed Effects (FE) estimation removes a lot of variation in the data and consequently reduces 
the signal-to-noise ratio which in effect is likely to bias the estimates towards zero. On the 
other hand is fiscal decentralization probably measured more consistent over time within 
countries than across countries. This is a strong argument for relying primarily on fixed 




Although the data set provided by Stegarescu (2005) represents an improvement to the current 
data it is not flawless. In particular one might worry that tax revenue decentralization will be 
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations due to differing elasticities of the tax base of sub-
central and central government even when the assignment of competencies remains 
unchanged. To avoid that such business cycle fluctuations create a spurious relation between 
decentralization and government expenditures I base the regressions on period averages for all 
                                                 
10 To isolate the effect of decentralization on redistribution it would be useful to have some 
measure of the welfare entitlements of a standardized household across countries. This is the 
strategy followed by Fiva and Rattsø (2005), studying welfare competition among Norwegian 
local governments. Such a measure is hard, if not impossible, to obtain in the cross country 
setting. 
11 As a robustness test I also check whether my fixed effects estimations are robust to the 
exclusion of the federal countries which have had a stable vertical government structure from 
1970 to 2000.    14
variables.
12 A period is defined as 5 consecutive non-overlapping years between 1970 and 
2000.
13 Introducing period averages will reduce the measurement problem induced by 
business cycles. In addition I include several macro variables as controls: the unemployment 
rate (will also capture direct entitlement pressures), gdp per capita and economic growth.  
 
In addition to the macro variables it is obviously important to control for other variables 
which may be correlated with both decentralization and government spending. Previous 
studies have focused on a number of explanatory variables. Rodrik (1998) have shown that 
one of the most important determinants of government spending is the economy’s exposure to 
trade. Other variables that are typically found to be important are demographic and structural 
characteristics. Consequently I control for openness, country size (population) and the share 
of people that are: living in rural areas, are under 15 years and are above 65 years, 
respectively.
14 In addition to these proxies for political demand I also control explicitly for 
partisanship by including the share of the cabinet from left and center parties.  
 
Previous research has found a negative relationship between a simple dummy for federal 
political systems, as defined according to for example Riker (1964)
15, and government 
spending. Cameron (1978) for example, whose main contribution was to discuss the role of an 
open economy in promoting public spending, found that federalism ‘dampens the degree of 
expansion in the public economy’ (Cameron 1978:1253). Some have interpreted the negative 
effect of a dummy for federalism to be driven by fiscal competition. Consequently it is of 
interest to investigate whether the effect of decentralization is robust to the inclusion of a 
simple dummy for federalism.
16 Note that because there is time variation in federalism only 
for one country, Belgium, inference must be based on cross country variation which is 
vulnerable to omitted variable bias.  
                                                 
12 Note that the panel data studies by Jin and Zou (2002) and Rodden (2003) have based their 
inference on year-to-year changes. 
13 The first period consist of 6 years, 1970-1975. 
14 Note that the share of people above 65 will automatically influence my measure of 
transfers. In principle, a measure that excluded pension spending would be a better measure of 
transfers in this setting because decisions about pension spending are highly centralized 
irrespective of public sector structure.  
15 A federal country has according to Riker (1964) at least two levels of government where 
each level must have ‘at least one area in which it is autonomous’. This must be formally 
guaranteed in for instance a constitution (Riker, 1964:11, Treisman, 2002).  
16 The following countries were coded as federations: Australia, Austria, Belgium (since 




Table 2 displays the benchmark results. The results are based on period averages for 18 
countries, 1970-2000, where a full set of period dummies are included to soak up common 
period specific shocks. Two different versions of (i), (ii) and (iii) are estimated, one where 
revenue decentralization enters alone and one where revenue decentralization and expenditure 
decentralization enters simultaneously, in addition to all other controls. Specification (1) and 
(2) in table 2 are reinvestigations of the classic Oates (1985) model, relying on pooled panel 
data from OECD countries and the improved tax revenue indicator. Controlling for 
expenditure decentralization, revenue decentralization is negatively associated with the size of 
government. Expenditure decentralization, on the other hand is, ceteris paribus, associated 
with a larger public sector. Contrary to what Oates (1985) found, it does seem to matter 
whether expenditure or tax revenue decentralization are used as a proxies for fiscal 
decentralization. 
 
According to specification (2) in table 2, it is not decentralization per se, but only fiscal 
federalism accompanied by decentralization of tax authority than can be expected to reduce 
the size of government. The asymmetric impact of the two measures of decentralization is 
consistent with the central findings of some recent studies that have taken the distinction 
between different types of decentralization seriously, notably Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden 
(2003) and Stein (1999). These studies suggest that vertical fiscal imbalance is an important 
determinant of the size of the public sector. Jin and Zou (2002) utilize panel data from 
developed and developing countries from the GFS. They estimate models where expenditure 
decentralization and tax revenue decentralization enter separately and find that expenditure 
decentralization increases the aggregate size of government, while tax revenue 
decentralization restricts it. Jin and Zou also find that a measure of vertical fiscal imbalance 
(the percentage sub-central government expenditure that is financed with grants) is positively 
associated with public sector size. Utilizing a similar panel data set, Rodden (2003) also finds 
that governments tend to grow faster when sub-central governments are more dependent on    16
Table 2 Fiscal decentralization and government expenditures (OLS estimations) 
   Government Size  Transfers   Government 
Consumption 
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
   Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error
TaxRevDec  -0.016 0.045  -0.124**  0.054 -0.082*** 0.024 -0.111*** 0.028 0.023 0.024 -0.039 0.027
ExpDec     0.251*** 0.076    0.061  0.040    0.151*** 0.039
Federation  -6.193*** 1.324 -7.438*** 1.404 -1.605**  0.703 -2.302*** 0.738 -4.131*** 0.709 -5.391*** 0.713
Unemployment  0.168 0.211 0.225 0.206 0.318*** 0.112 0.318*** 0.108 0.045 0.113 0.031 0.105
GDP_95us  -1.749  1.187 -2.268* 1.267 1.488** 0.630 1.542** 0.666 -1.143* 0.635 -1.394** 0.644
Growth  -1.627*** 0.568 -1.968*** 0.590 -0.842*** 0.302 -1.103*** 0.310 -0.727**  0.304 -0.986*** 0.300
Openness  0.089***  0.033  0.112*** 0.032 0.036**  0.017 0.037**  0.017 0.014 0.018 0.027 0.016
Population  -0.031 0.040 -0.030 0.044 -0.004 0.021 0.009 0.023 -0.035 0.021 -0.013 0.022
Population^2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rural 
population 
-0.071 0.049 -0.046 0.051 0.051* 0.026 0.076*** 0.027 -0.125***  0.026  -0.098*** 0.026
Under 15  -0.025 0.360 0.125 0.348 -0.096 0.191 -0.043 0.183 -0.210 0.193 -0.110 0.177
Over 65  1.285***  0.453  1.720*** 0.461 0.610**  0.240 0.709*** 0.242 -0.046 0.242 0.073 0.234
Left  0.043* 0.023 0.039* 0.022 0.023* 0.012 0.020* 0.011 0.019  0.012  0.017  0.011
Center  0.072***  0.025  0.074*** 0.024 0.046*** 0.013 0.045*** 0.013 0.023* 0.013 0.021* 0.012
R
2
adj  0.638 0.664 0.565 0.616 0.494 0.555 
Number of 
countries 
18 18 18 18 18 18 
Number of 
observations 
106 98 106 98 106 98 
Note: A constant term, period and country fixed effects are included in all specifications (not reported). The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
grants.
17 Finally, Stein (1999) employing cross country data from Latin America also finds 
that countries with larger vertical fiscal imbalance tend to have larger governments.  
 
What is the mechanism driving these results? An important aspect is that vertical fiscal 
imbalance typically is bridged through intergovernmental transfers and consequently 
associated with soft budget constrains. This introduces the possibility for sub-central 
governments to impose their costs on residents outside the jurisdiction (‘the problem of 
                                                 
17 In an extension, Rodden utilize information from the OECD (1999) analysis to distinguish 
between sub-central governments’ ability to set the tax rate and tax base autonomously. His 
cross-country estimations suggest a negative relationship between tax revenue 
decentralization and public sector size.   17
commons’). Generally is vertical fiscal imbalance associated with less accountability and 
bureaucrats/politicians that have weaker incentives to care about the financial consequences 
of fiscal competition and poor provision of public services. Thus, consistent with Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980)’s collusion argument, it is not surprising that expenditure decentralization, 
for given extent of tax revenue decentralization, is associated with a larger public sector. 
However, alternative mechanisms may also give similar results: public expenditures may 
increase when the public sector is more decentralized because there is a closer match with 
voter preferences or because there is less waste in the production of public services.  
 
A first attempt on explaining how different parts of the public sector are affected by fiscal 
decentralization is presented in specification (3) to (6) in table 2. Interestingly, it seems like 
transfers and government consumption are differently affected by fiscal decentralization. 
Social security transfers decrease with revenue decentralization, while no statistical 
significant effect is found for expenditure decentralization. Government consumption portrays 
a different picture: revenue decentralization is not important, while expenditure 
decentralization increases government consumption. This suggests that the negative effect of 
revenue decentralization and positive effect of expenditure decentralization on overall 
government size might be driven by two different parts of government expenditures. 
 
It is not trivial to assign the welfare consequences of the established relationships. 
Decentralization of taxing powers seems to be negatively associated with government size, 
but this seems primarily to be driven by reduction in transfers. Consequently one might 
speculate that restricting Leviathan is not so important. Perhaps a more important aspect is 
that decentralized responsibility for redistribution creates a migration externality which yields 
lower redistribution in equilibrium (as technically modeled in Wildasin, 1991). This idea 
dates back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave (1959) – which concluded that distributional 
concerns, including social insurance and progressive taxation, must be met largely, if not 
entirely, at the central level. Decentralized generous redistributive programs will serve to 
attract low-income households and chase away those with higher incomes whose taxes must 
finance the transfers. Generosity can be considered more costly when households are mobile. 
Because the concern about migration depress taxation and redistributive spending in all 
jurisdictions, no jurisdiction succeeds in repelling ‘poor’ households and the equilibrium is 
characterized by sub-optimal levels of redistribution from the society’s point of view. This 
story might be driving the negative effect of tax revenue decentralization on total government   18
expenditures. Of course it cannot be ruled out that increased tax revenue decentralization 
yields more efficient provision of social security, for example by better targeting benefits to 
those that are truly in need. However if this is the case, then it would be reasonable to expect a 
negative effect in particular of expenditure decentralization and not of revenue 
decentralization, not the other way around. Similarly it is puzzling that there is a negative 
effect of revenue decentralization and not expenditure decentralization if the intuition lying 
behind the Keen and Marchand (1997) model are the correct one.  
 
How large is the economic impact? Based on cross country estimations, an increase in 
revenue decentralization with one standard deviation (17 percentage points) decreases total 
government expenditures and transfers with around 2 percentage points out of GDP. This 
corresponds to 0.2 and 0.4 of a standard deviation in total government expenditures and 
transfers, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in expenditure decentralization (13 
percentage points) increases total government expenditures and government consumption 
with around 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively. 
 
Previous research has found a negative relationship between a simple dummy for federalism 
and welfare spending. This finding is confirmed in table 2. Federal countries seem to spend 
less on both transfers and government consumption. It is interesting to note that the impact of 
the decentralization indicators and the federation dummy seem to be quite independent of 
each other. The effects of revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization are 
basically unaltered if federation  is excluded from the regressions, although the statistical 




Cross-country evidence has a number of shortcomings. As discussed above, it may be 
problematic to base inference on variation between countries if cross section heterogeneity is 
large. If there are some inherent features of different countries that affect government 
spending which are not accurately captured by any of the included regressors, than the correct 
approach is to include a full set of country dummies. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) criticize the 
standard approach in welfare state research and argue that leaving out country fixed effects is 
                                                 
18 The raw correlation between revenue decentralization (expenditure decentralization) and 
federation is 0.34 (0.47).   19
likely to give substantial bias in the results. In the following I report different specifications 
that take into account country fixed effects (FE). These are reported in table 3.  
 
The main results from the OLS analysis are reproduced when country specific fixed effects 
are controlled for. Revenue decentralization is associated with less transfers (but now only 
statistically significant at the 10% level), and expenditure decentralization is associated with 
increased government consumption. There is evidence (on the 10% level of significance) that 
overall government expenditure increases with increased decentralized responsibility for 
expenditures.  
 
Table 3 Fiscal decentralization and government expenditures (FE estimations) 
   Government Size  Transfers   Government 
Consumption 
  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   Coeff. St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error
TaxRevDec  0.073 0.095 0.006  0.104  -0.084  0.063  -0.128* 0.068 0.108***  0.035  0.058  0.035 
ExpDec     0.289*  0.172     0.054  0.112     0.197*** 0.058 
Unemployment 0.638***  0.174  0.515*** 0.190 0.389*** 0.115 0.376*** 0.124 0.222*** 0.064 0.191*** 0.064 
GDP_95us  -3.296* 1.895 -5.773*  3.061 -1.936 1.247  -2.263  1.991 0.583 0.696 1.127 1.034 
Growth  -0.980*** 0.347 -1.051*** 0.388  -0.203  0.228 -0.458* 0.253 -0.234**  0.127  -0.373*** 0.131 
Openness  -0.083  0.055  -0.100  0.060  -0.005  0.036 -0.009 0.039 -0.054***  0.020 -0.035* 0.020 
Population  -0.627* 0.336 -1.206** 0.494 -0.205 0.221  -0.467  0.321 -0.387***  0.123  -0.379** 0.167 
Population^2  0.001*  0.001  0.002**  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001***  0.000 0.001* 0.000 
Rural 
population 
0.095 0.153 0.242  0.178  0.086 0.101  0.237** 0.116 -0.195***  0.056  -0.131** 0.060 
Under 15  0.272 0.352 0.456  0.497  0.560**  0.232  0.478  0.323 -0.088  0.129  0.250  0.168 
Over 65  1.620*** 0.551  1.443**  0.668 0.843** 0.362  0.941** 0.435 0.277  0.202 0.422* 0.226 
Left  -0.001 0.013 -0.007  0.014  -0.004 0.008  -0.004  0.009 0.002  0.005  -0.002  0.005 
Center  0.004 0.018 -0.001  0.019  0.009 0.012  0.009  0.012 -0.003  0.007  -0.002  0.006 
R
2
adj  0.941 0.941 0.891  0.898  0.961  0.966 
Number of 
countries 
18 18 18  18  18  18 
Number of 
observations 
106 98 106  98  106  98 
Note: A constant term, period and country fixed effects are included in all specifications (not reported). The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Inference in the FE estimations is based on countries that have altered their vertical 
government structure over time. This means that decentralization trends observed in particular   20
for Belgium, France and Spain contribute considerably to identifying the effect of tax revenue 
decentralization on government spending. But also other countries that have changed their 
vertical government structure between 1970 and 2000 contribute to identifying the main 
coefficients of interest.  
 
Among the countries in my sample, the traditional federal countries stand out. They have had 
a very stable vertical government structures in the period that I study. Consequently one may 
argue that they should not be included in the fixed effects estimation where inference is based 
purely on within country variation. An argument for doing so is nonetheless that they help to 
identify other effects and consequently yields more precise estimates also of the 
decentralization variables. As a robustness check I analyze how my results are affected by 
excluding the traditional federal countries. This is reported in table 4. I find that the main 
results are confirmed when the countries with the least variation in the central independent 
variables are excluded. Expenditure decentralization is associated with increased government 
consumption and a larger public sector. But no statistically significant effect of tax revenue 
decentralization on social security transfers can be found with this sample.  
 
Table 4 Fiscal decentralization and government expenditures, traditional federal 
countries excluded (FE estimations) 
   Government Size  Transfers   Government 
Consumption 
  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
   Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error Coeff. St.error
TaxRevDec  0.139 0.125 0.059 0.147 -0.023 0.075 -0.067 0.078 0.117***  0.043 0.049 0.042
ExpDec     0.294*  0.267    0.047  0.142    0.203**  0.075
R
2
adj  0.929 0.924 0.893 0.911 0.965 0.973 
Number of 
countries 
12 12 12 12 12 12 
Number of 
observations 
70 63 70 63 70 63 
Note: A constant term, period and country fixed effects and control variables as used in previous estimations are 
included in all specifications (not reported). The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
The control variables reported in table 3 show the more or less expected pattern. The 
macroeconomic variables, unemployment, income and economic growth, are important. An 
increase in unemployment is associated with a larger public sector, and in particular transfer   21
spending. This becomes particularly clear when inference is based only on within country 
variation.  Unemployment captures both automatic entitlement pressures and political 
demands. Economic growth is negatively associated with public sector size which suggests a 
countercyclical pattern. Relying on within country variation, no support for Wagner’s law, 
which states that the demand for government services is income elastic, is found. In fact gdp 
per capita enters with a negative sign in specification (8), which is significant at the 10% 
level.  
 
On theoretical grounds it is not clear how increased integration into the world economy 
affects welfare spending. On the one hand is economic integration likely to create competition 
for cross country mobile factors in a similar fashion as interjurisdictional competition within a 
country. Hans-Werner Sinn, among others, has been concerned about this development for the 
European welfare states (see for example Sinn, 2003). However, it can also be argued that 
government spending is expected to increase if governments expand the welfare state to 
provide a cushion against external risks (Rodrik 1997, 1998). Relying on cross country 
inference a positive relationship is observed, and the effect on total government expenditures 
is driven by increases in transfers, which seems reasonable if government expenditures play a 
risk-mitigating role (Rodrik, 1998). When country fixed effects are included, such a positive 
relationship is no longer observed. In fact openness seems to depress government 
consumption according to specification (12). Finally, there is some evidence based on cross 
country regressions that left and center governments are associated with a larger public sector, 
but this effect also vanishes if country fixed effects are included. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
A large empirical literature has looked for evidence of downward pressure on taxes and 
expenditures from decentralization of fiscal powers. Until recently most cross country studies 
have ignored the distinction between taxes which the sub-central government can alter 
autonomously and taxes the sub-central government do not have full discretion upon. This 
paper adds to the empirical literature by utilizing improved data on tax revenue 
decentralization to re-examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of 
government. An important lesson from this paper is that whether revenue generation and 
expenditures, or just expenditures, is decentralized matters for both the size and composition 
of the public sector. Vertical fiscal imbalance, in the sense of more expenditure   22
decentralization for given revenue decentralization, is associated with a larger public sector. 
This effect seems to be driven by increased public consumption. Revenue decentralization is 
on the other hand associated with a smaller public sector, primarily due to less spending on 
social security transfers.    23
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Appendix Table A.1 Descriptive statistics and documentation 
Variable   Definition  Source Mean  St.dev.  Min  Max 
Government Size 
Total outlays (excluding consumption of fixed capital) consists of current disbursements plus 
gross capital formation, acquisitions less disposals of non-produced non-financial assets, net 
capital transfers payable less consumption of fixed capital, percent of GDP. Current 
disbursements consists of final consumption expenditure, subsidies, property income payable, 
current taxes on income and wealth payable, social benefits other than social transfers in kind 
and other current transfers. 
A 43.937  8.886  22.325  64.438 
Transfers  Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP. Consists of benefits for sickness, old-age, 
family allowances etc., social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by general government. A 14.934  4.468 5.600  27.540 
Government Consumption  Government final consumption expenditure, percent of GDP.  A  20.058  3.926  11.070  29.189 
TaxRevDec 
Sub-central government own tax revenue divided by general government total tax revenue. Only 
tax revenue from taxes where the sub-central government autonomously can change the tax rate, 
tax base or both are included in the nominator.  
B 21.460  16.931  0.278  59.058 
ExpDec  Sub-central government expenditure divided by general government expenditure.  C  33.773  13.120  3.463  58.821 
Unemployment   Unemployment rates, standardized as far as possible according to OECD criteria  D  6.768  4.105  0.380  20.900 
Left  Cabinet composition: Percent of government from left parties, weighted by days  D  36.799  33.259  0.000  100.000 
Center  Cabinet composition: Percent of government from center parties, weighted by days  D  25.607  28.369  0.000  100.000 
Under 15  Percent of population 0-14 years of age  E  21.100  3.392  15.676  31.267 
Over 65  Percent of population 65 years of age and above  E  13.359  2.254  7.482  17.860 
Population  Total population in millions  E  36.355  57.938  3.054  275.189 
Rural population  Percent of population living in rural areas  E  27.008  13.088  3.020  71.270 
GDP_95us  GDP per capita in  10 000, 1995-US dollars   E  2.242  0.774  0.685  4.508 
Growth  Growth rate in GDP  E 2.878  1.394  -0.523  9.790 
Openness  Total trade (export + imports), in percent of GDP   F  56.398  28.428  11.990  165.890 
Note: The data are collected from six different data sources: (A) OECD’s Historical Statistics, section 6, (B) Dan Stegarescu’s data set (2005), (C) IMF Government Finance 
Statistics
19, (D) The Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2004), (E) The World Development Indicators and (F) The Penn World Table Version 6.1 (Heston et al. 
2001).  Descriptives based on periods averages, 98 observations. 
                                                 
19 Downloadable from: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm    28
Appendix table A.2 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, country-by-country. 
Country Government  Size  Transfers  Government Consumption 
  Mean  St. Dev  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  St. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  St. Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
AUSTRALIA 33.19  3.17  27.31  35.96  7.19 1.44  4.65  8.63  18.34  1.21  16.05  19.54 
AUSTRIA 48.00  4.06  40.64  51.74  17.65  1.36 15.69 18.91  18.80  1.56 15.85 20.03 
BELGIUM 51.87  5.52  43.26  60.03  16.34  1.91 12.92 18.73  21.46  1.49 19.06 23.60 
CANADA 42.78  4.60  35.98  49.07  10.61  2.34  7.55  13.76  21.56  1.29  19.47  23.22 
DENMARK 51.06  5.99  41.10  56.55  16.26  2.92 11.53 19.73  25.51  1.53 22.77 27.49 
FINLAND 43.11  8.62  31.70  56.28  14.52  5.23  7.80  22.20  20.25  2.80  15.95  24.16 
FRANCE 46.28  4.87  38.23  50.50  17.06  1.14 15.44 18.43  21.98  2.30 17.90 23.70 
GERMANY 45.96  2.15  41.91  47.92  16.66  1.62 14.13 19.05  19.55  0.81 18.08 20.46 
IRELAND 43.17  7.02  32.80  53.85  12.60  2.40  9.84  15.62  17.74  2.02  14.58  20.50 
JAPAN 30.77  4.68  22.32  36.34  8.91  1.96 5.61 10.92  13.70  1.37  11.55 15.77 
NETHERLANDS 53.58  7.10  43.66  61.39 22.47  5.30  13.21  27.78 25.02  1.63  22.88  27.26 
NORWAY 45.89  2.87  43.11  50.22  13.91  1.69 11.99 16.50  19.59  1.48 17.25 21.53 
PORTUGAL 37.50  7.77  23.62  44.50  10.29  2.81  4.81  12.80  15.39  2.79  12.76  19.28 
SPAIN 35.70  8.19  22.88  44.77  13.93  2.72 9.46 16.91  15.16  2.92  10.54 18.27 
SWEDEN 57.36  6.94  44.95  64.44  18.05  3.19 12.74 22.38  27.05  1.97 23.54 29.19 
SWITZERLAND 30.74  4.03  23.92  35.28 11.88  1.49 9.66 13.38  13.13  1.20  11.07 14.52 
UNITED KINGDOM  41.72  2.41  38.80  45.49  12.71  2.15  9.32  15.26  20.17  1.14  18.54  21.77 
UNITED STATES  33.45  2.11  30.60  35.76  11.13 1.48  8.93  12.78  16.65 1.15  14.53  17.67 
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